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I. INTRODUCTION
A Child of any age may be tried as an adult under Florida law.' When
charged as an adult, a child is required to be treated "in all respects as an
* Richard L. Rosenbaum, of the Law Offices of Richard L. Rosenbaum, Fort Lauder-
dale, Florida. Rosenbaum received his J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center, in 1983. Rosenbaum is licensed to practice law in the United States Su-
preme Court, the Third, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit courts of appeal, and throughout
the state of Florida in all state and federal courts. Rosenbaum became Lionel Tate's attorney
after Tate was convicted, but prior to Tate being sentenced. Special thanks are given to
Cheryl Zickler, Esq., appellate co-counsel on behalf of Lionel Tate for her assistance in help-
ing formulate and articulate the arguments lodged on Lionel tate's appeal.
1. Section 985.225 of the Florida Statutes states:
(1) A child of any age who is charged with a violation of state law punishable by death or by
life imprisonment is subject to the jurisdiction of the court as set forth in s. 985.219(8) unless
and until an indictment on the charge is returned by the grand jury. When such indictment is
1
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adult.",2 What this means in reality is that children who are unable to drive,
vote, consume alcohol, hold public office, or even fight for our country, face
up to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. Immature "ba-
bies" can become embroiled in Florida's adult criminal justice system; and as
the law stands now, judges lack the necessary discretion in certain cases to
impose a sentence other than life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, no matter how young the accused. This article addresses how un-
fairly Florida treats children prosecuted as adults; the prosecution and con-
viction of twelve-year-old Lionel Tate and the subsequent appellate reversal
of the conviction; pending legislative bills regarding the prosecution of juve-
niles; and a suggestion as to how Florida can rehabilitate children accused or
convicted of committing "adult crimes" through treatment and counseling,
instead of incarcerating them.
Counsel for children charged or convicted as adults, and juvenile justice
organizations throughout Florida and the world have argued that Florida's
"juvenile transfer statutes" are unconstitutional on their face and as applied
on numerous levels.3 Unfortunately, thus far the courts have been less than
receptive to these arguments. For example, in Brazill v. State, the court
noted that child defendants have unsuccessfully argued that section 985.225
of the Florida Statutes is unconstitutional as a violation of due process, equal
protection, and separation of powers.4
The jurisdiction of the court attaches to the child, and the case, upon
service of a summons on the child and a parent, a legal or actual custodian,
or guardian of the child.5 If a child is taken into custody, jurisdiction at-
returned, the petition for delinquency, if any, must be dismissed and the child must be tried
and handled in every respect as an adult:
(a) On the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment; and
(b) On all other felonies or misdemeanors charged in the indictment which are based on the
same act or transaction as the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment or on one or
more acts or transactions connected with the offense punishable by death or by life imprison-
ment.
(3) If the child is found to have committed the offense punishable by death or by life impris-
onment, the child shall be sentenced as an adult. If the juvenile is not found to have committed
the indictable offense but is found to have committed a lesser included offense or any other of-
fense for which he or she was indicted as a part of the criminal episode, the court may sentence
pursuant to s. 985.233.
FLA. STAT. § 985.225 (2003) (emphasis added).
2. See id.
3. See Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Brazill v. State, 845
So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Phillips v. State, 861 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
4. Brazill, 845 So. 2d at 286.
5. § 985.219(7).
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taches before or after the filing of a petition, whichever occurs first, regard-
less of whether a summons was served.6 Thereafter the court controls the
prosecution of the child.' Appellate tribunals have sloughed off claims that
section 985.225 violates the law citing "easy affirmance" language:
[t]he constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo.8 There is a strong
presumption that a statute is constitutionally valid.9 It is well established
that where reasonably possible and consistent with constitutional rights, a
statute will be interpreted by the courts in a manner that resolves all doubt
in favor of its validity.
10
It is based upon Chapter 985 that unintended results occur. Even prosecutors
may deem a life sentence without parole unjust when imposed on a child
Defendant who has never before been charged with any criminal offense. In
Tate's case, not only the prosecutor but the victim's family, and a warden
from the Department of Juvenile Justice Level X facility joined in his quest
for a non-mandatory sentence. Luckily, in Tate's case, he was spared from
serving a mandatory life imprisonment sentence without the possibility of
parole." However, until legislative changes are enacted, children will con-
tinue facing the possibility of life in prison without parole upon conviction.
II. FLORIDA'S TRANSFER STATUTES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL: YOUNG
CHILDREN PROSECUTED UNDER FLORIDA LAW ARE TREATED MORE
HARSHLY THAN OTHERS PROSECUTED IN VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS TO
EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Child advocates assert that children's rights to equal protection and due
process of law, under both the United States and Florida Constitution, are
violated when they are transferred to adult court pursuant to section 985.225
of the Florida Statutes, and are sentenced to life imprisonment without pa-
role for a first degree felony offense. 12 This is the "younger generation,"
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002); Dickerson v. State, 783 So.
2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199,
1203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
9. See McGrath, 824 So. 2d at 146; In re Estate of Caldwell v. Caldwell, 247 So. 2d 1, 3
(Fla. 1971); Dickerson, 783 So. 2d at 1146.
10. Brazill, 845 So. 2d at 287 (citing DuFresne v. State, 826 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. 2002));
see also State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So. 2d 48,
51 (Fla. 1974).
11. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
2004]
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many of whom are not yet competent to be treated as adults and not yet ma-
ture enough to understand that when adults say "life"-they mean LIFE.
Furthermore, in Florida, a juvenile's competency to stand trial or be sen-
tenced is assessed by adult standards. 3 Slightly older juveniles, who are
convicted as adults for crimes punishable by life imprisonment, crimes
committed with actual premeditation or malice, are entitled to a pre-
sentencing hearing to determine whether they will be sentenced as juveniles
or as adults. A child's transfer to adult court from juvenile court constitutes
a fundamental error, which "reaches down to the validity of the trial itself,"
and it is this type of error where the interests of justice present a compelling
demand for its application. "
Section 985.225 fails to comport with minimal due process require-
ments for children under fourteen years of age, and is unconstitutional as
applied to children. 5 The Florida and United States Constitutions each pro-
vide that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."' 6 Substantive due process protects the full panoply of
individual rights from unwarranted encroachment by the government; and
procedural due process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair treatment through
the proper administration of justice where substantive rights are at issue. 7
When basic rights are at stake, the means by which the State can protect its
interest must be narrowly tailored to achieve it's objectives through the least
restrictive means.'
8
Under the Florida Constitution, the Legislature may restrict or qualify
the right to juvenile treatment, and may conclude that certain juveniles are
not entitled to juvenile procedure and sanctions.' 9 This is not, however, a
license to deny the basic requirements of due process of law once in adult
court.2 °
Florida's transfer statutes offer three charging options to a prosecutor
when a juvenile is fourteen or fifteen years of age, has no prior violent of-
13. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210.
14. FLA. STAT. § 985.225 (2003); Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d. 89, 96 (Fla. 2000).
15. See Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991) (providing a
framework for determining whether due process has been violated when substantive rights are
at issue, and restating the proper balancing tests under the Florida Constitution).
16. FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 9; U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
17. Dep "t of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 959.
18. Id. at 964 (citing FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9).
19. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 15(b); Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.
1977).
20. See State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1978) (holding the Legislature may
have the right to create offenses, but the court has the right to dictate procedures that comply
with due process).
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fenses, and is alleged to have committed an offense punishable by life im-
prisonment: 21 1) the juvenile court retains jurisdiction; 2) the prosecutors
may seek an indictment; 22 or 3) the State can prosecute the juvenile as an
adult by the direct filing of an information.23 If, however, the juvenile is
under fourteen years of age, only options one and two are available. 24 Sec-
tion 985.225 is the only statute, which allows for the transfer of children un-
der fourteen years of age to adult court.
From that moment on, the child faces a mandatory life sentence, and the
child's circumstances-the child's capacity to form criminal intent, the
child's age, the lack of specific intent to harm, and the likelihood of rehabili-
tation-are all deemed irrelevant.
Compounding the problem is the more lenient treatment afforded older
juveniles. Those juveniles are entitled to a hearing to determine the propriety
of juvenile versus adult sanctions. The only way to charge a thirteen-year-
old child or younger as an adult is by indictment; and therefore, the youngest
offenders receive the harshest treatment.25
The inequity is that juveniles who are indicted pursuant to section
985.225 must be sentenced as adults; while older juveniles, which the court
obtains jurisdiction via the filing of an information,26 may be sentenced as an
adult or as a juvenile.27 When determining whether juvenile sanctions
should be imposed, the court is required to consider eight factors, including
the sophistication and maturity of the offender, prior adjudications, and pros-
pects for rehabilitation.28
Adults must account for their criminal actions even when their life cir-
cumstances and childhoods were exceptionally difficult. Section 985.225
holds children of any age to this same ideal, without inquiring into any pre-
dispositions or environmental challenges, without any standards for mental
capacity or ability to form criminal intent, and without a finding of inten-
tional wrongdoing. In addition, section 985.225 is too broad as it does not
21. Section 985.225 states that children who are charged with a violation of state law
punishable by death or by life imprisonment may be transferred to adult court once an indict-
ment is returned. See Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1999) (stating death sentences
for children under seventeen years of age constitute cruel or unusual punishment).
22. FLA. STAT. § 985.225 (2003).
23. § 985.227(l)(a). The state may prosecute a child of fourteen or fifteen by the discre-
tionary direct filing of an information for murder, robbery, kidnapping, and sexual battery. Id.
24. See § 985.225.
25. Id.
26. § 985.227(1).
27. § 985.233(4)(2).
28. § 985.233(1)(b).
2004]
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distinguish between those who commit premeditated murder with a capacity
to form criminal intent, and those who commit less culpable life felonies.
While the State may have a compelling interest in promoting public
safety, treating children of any age as adults in every way, and punishing the
children for punishment sake is inconsistent with public policy. 29 Section
985.225 does not reflect the State's parens patriae interest-promoting the
welfare of children involved in criminal activity.30 "Reprehensible acts by
juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent choice
but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond
their control."'"
Equal protection provides that all persons similarly situated be treated
alike. 32 Applying the equal protection clause to state action, the question is
whether some rational explanation justifies the disparate treatment of simi-
larly situated children.33 When an age restriction is attacked on due process
or equal protection grounds, it must be shown that: 1) the restriction is rea-
sonable, and 2) the restriction is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppres-
sive.34
Prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding whether to charge or file
a decision. The concern is the arbitrary and oppressive treatment of children
convicted of crimes punishable by life imprisonment, who committed a
crime that did not require the showing of intentional wrongdoing. Compare
this to the treatment of older juveniles who were convicted of life felonies,
but were initially charged by the direct filing of an information.
A statutory scheme that mandates adult sanctions for our youngest ju-
venile offenders simply because they were indicted; and permits juvenile
sanctions for older offenders who committed crimes with malice or premedi-
tation because the law does not require an indictment, cannot be rationally
justified. "[T]he requirement of a grand jury indictment only ensures that
29. It is also at odds with a parents' right to the care and custody of their children, and the
children's concomitant rights. Certainly at some point, a child is very young the inquiry into
culpability, capacity, and competency so minimal, and the period of incarceration so long, that
the parent's rights must also be weighed. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982);
see also Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991).
30. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); P.W.G. v. State, 702 So. 2d 488, 491
(Fla. 1977).
31. McKeiverv. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1971).
32. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446
(1972); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
33. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446; State v. Walborn, 729 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
34. Walborn, 729 So. 2d at 505.
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there is probable cause for the charge it does not determine the propriety of
prosecuting a juvenile as an adult."35
In State v. Cain, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the argument
that the transfer statutes violated due process and equal protection rights by
giving prosecutors unbridled discretion to prosecute juveniles as adults with-
out a hearing. 36 However, the statutory scheme has changed since Cain. In
1980, the transfer statutes gave equal treatment to all juveniles, regardless of
age or indictment, by requiring a disposition hearing to determine whether
juvenile or adult sanctions were appropriate, and to determine whether to
offer the juvenile the benefits of the Youthful Offender Act.37 The court rea-
soned that because juveniles, who are amenable to rehabilitation, will be
considered for juvenile sanctions, the transfer statutes did not violate the
juvenile's due process rights. 38 In Goodson, the court reasoned that the Flor-
ida Legislature did not intend to treat younger juvenile offenders more
harshly than older juvenile offenders; and therefore, juveniles who were in-
dicted and those who waived into adult court were also entitled to the bene-
fits of the Youthful Offender Act.39 Such sentencing disparity, based on the
discretionary charging authority of a prosecutor, causes disparate results
when based solely upon age, because the younger, presumably less culpable
offenders, are subject to receive the harshest penalties.
1II. FLORIDA TRANSFER STATUTES VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FLORIDA'S NON-
DELEGATION DOCTRINE
Defense counsel for children similarly advocate that Florida's transfer
statutes, offend due process and State and Federal law by violating the Sepa-
ration of Powers and Non-Delegation Doctrines of the United States and
Florida Constitution.4" The Legislature has unlawfully delegated its author-
ity to define crimes and structure penalties by allowing a state attorney to
35. State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1i61, 1365 (Fla. 1980).
36. Id.
37. See chapter 958 of the Florida Statutes; see also Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1366; Goodson
v. State, 392 So. 2d 1335, 1337 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980), decision Approved by State v.
Goodson, 403 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1981) (establishing that all juveniles tried as adults are con-
sidered for juvenile sanctions, whether jurisdiction was pursuant to an indictment or the filing
of an information).
38. Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1366.
39. Goodson, 392 So. 2d at 1337.
40. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. Florida's Constitution "requires a strict separation of pow-
ers" analysis on the issue of non-delegation, and therefore this argument will focuses Florida
law. See B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 991 (Fla. 1985).
2004]
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seek an indictment for children under fourteen, thereby delegating the deci-
sion to charge children "of any age" of a crime punishable by death or life
imprisonment.4 The Florida Legislature has delegated this authority without
implementing any guidelines to ensure the executive branch is carrying out
the legislature's intent.
The prosecuting attorney has the discretion to bring charges in juvenile
court, or seek an indictment pursuant to section 985.225. If a prosecutor
chooses to present a case to a Grand Jury, the Grand Jury will most likely
indict the accused because a Grand Jury "would indict a ham sandwich.1 2 In
Tate's case, at the age of twelve, he was indicted for premeditated murder in
the first degree. 43 Because he was indicted by a Grand Jury, the only avail-
able penalties for Tate were either 1) life imprisonment without the possibil-
ity of parole, or 2) death. The age of twelve was too young for our society to
accept that he should be executed by the State. However, he was also too
young to be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, but he was sen-
tenced to life without parole nonetheless. The court rejected the sentencing
argument, instead overturning Tate's conviction on the competency issue.
44
Section 985.227 allows a state attorney to charge fourteen or fifteen-
year-old children accused of a life felony by the direct filing of an informa-
tion.45 The state attorney is only authorized to do this "when in the state at-
torney's judgment and discretion the public interest requires that adult sanc-
tions be considered or imposed."' 6 The statute also requires the state attor-
ney to develop written policies and guidelines that will govern the determina-
tions for filing an information against a juvenile, and to submit those guide-
lines to the Governor and State Legislature."7 Finally, upon conviction, the
court has the discretion to impose either juvenile or adult sanctions based on
the consideration of eight statutory criteria. 48  However, unlike section
985.227, section 985.225 provides no similar guidelines or requirements on
the state attorney's office, and fails to provide the Grand Jury with proce-
dures for determining the propriety of adult sanctions for an accused child
under the age of fourteen. Once charged by the Grand Jury for a life felony,
adult sanctions are mandatory. 49 Open-ended authority is thereby granted to
41. See FLA. STAT. § 985.225 (2003).
42. Kearns v. Wolverton, 381 S.E.2d 258, 262 (W. Va 1989).
43. § 784.02.
44. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
45. § 985.227(1)(a).
46. § 985.227(l)(a).
47. § 985.227(4).
48. § 985.233(4)(b).
49. § 985.233(4)(a).
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the executive branch to seek an indictment of a child of any age, and treat the
child "in every respect as an adult."5° The requirement that a Grand Jury
must indict "only ensures that there is probable cause for the charge; it does
not determine the propriety of prosecuting a juvenile as an adult.'
When the juvenile court is vested with original jurisdiction of a child,
that jurisdiction confers special rights and immunities by the juvenile code
and a transfer or waiver of that jurisdiction must satisfy the basic require-
ments of due process and fairness." The Supreme Court described the criti-
cal importance of the transfer decision: "[t]here is no place in our system of
law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without cere-
mony... Prior to Kent, challenges to Florida's juvenile transfer statutes
have not been successful; however, critical changes in the statutes illuminate
the need to revisit the constitutionality of section 985.225.
It is well established that the Legislature may not delegate the power to
exercise unbridled discretion in applying the law. 4 While the Supreme
Court of Florida rejected the assertion that Florida law amounted to an
unlawful delegation of authority,55 the statutory scheme has changed drasti-
cally since 1980. Most significantly, children of any age, who are indicted
for life felonies, are no longer entitled to a hearing to determine whether ju-
venile or adult sanctions will be imposed. Further, Cain addressed the
prosecutor's discretion to charge a sixteen or seventeen-year-old repeat of-
fender as an adult, where that teenager would receive a hearing to determine
the propriety of juvenile or adult sanctions upon conviction.56
A child's rights to due process of law is violated under both the Florida
and United States Constitutions when the child is transferred to adult court
for criminal prosecution at age twelve, and treated "in every respect like an
adult."57 A statute that treats a child of any age as an adult in every way,
50. See § 985.225.
51. State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1365 (Fla. 1980).
52. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 552 (1966) (stating due process required a hearing and
representation of competent counsel before transfer where statute required a "full investiga-
tion" prior to transfer).
53. Id.
54. Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1367.
55. Id. at 1368.
56. Id.
57. § 985.225. Section 985.225, provides:
A child of any age who is charged with a violation of state law punishable by death or life im-
prisonment is subject to the jurisdiction of the court as set fourth in Section 985.219(7) unless
and until an indictment on the charge is returned by the grand jury. When such indictment is
returned, the petition for delinquency, if any, must be dismissed and the child must be tried and
handled in every respect as an adult.
Id. (emphasis added).
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without procedural protections, triggers numerous process concerns, includ-
ing the intrusion into a child's right to privacy, where principles of funda-
mental fairness and Constitutional scrutiny must be reapplied to the facts of
each case and the law.
Due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unre-
lated to time, place, and circumstance. Rather the phrase expresses the
requirement of 'fundamental fairness,' a requirement whose meaning can be
as opaque as its importance lofty. '58 Courts have determined that a child's
due process rights are not violated when the child is denied the
"rehabilitative aspect of juvenile court solely because the state decided to
procure an indictment."59 Unfortunately, there is no absolute right conferred
by common law, constitution, or otherwise, requiring children to be treated
in a special system for juvenile offenders. 60  The Florida Constitution a
"child" as defined by law may be charged "with a violation of law as an act
of delinquency instead of [a] crime.,,6' The Supreme Court of Florida has
interpreted this provision to mean that "a child has the right to be treated as a
juvenile delinquent only to the extent provided by our legislature. ' '62 Only
the legislature has the power to determine who, if anyone, is entitled to
treatment as a juvenile.63
Subjecting children under fourteen years of age to the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent defies the common law doctrine of incapacity, contemporary
scientific research on child and adolescent organic brain structure, and public
policy concerning juvenile delinquency. Due process should require that a
child have the capacity to form criminal intent for murder before he can be
sentenced to life without parole for murder. For example, the State failed to
establish Tate's capacity to form criminal intent. The State did not need to
58. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
59. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Brazill v.
State, 845 So. 2d 282, 287 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
60. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla.
1975) (noting that it was within legislative authority pursuant to Article I, Section 15(b) of the
Florida Constitution, to create an exception where children would be treated as adults); State
v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1363 (Fla. 1980).
61. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 15(b).
62. Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1363.
63. Id.; see also Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that
"treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, there-
fore the legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or
discriminatory classification is involved").
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prove premeditation or malice to kill, and therefore it was never clear
whether Tate had the capacity to form criminal intent.' 4
Secondly, the court lacked jurisdiction prohibiting the State from prose-
cuting Tate for felony murder when he could not be held criminally respon-
sible for the underlying felony. In Florida, the law and legislative intent is
that children under fourteen are not criminally responsible in adult court for
aggravated child abuse, because it is not a "life felony," and thus section
985.225 is not implicated. The clear inference is that the Legislature did not
intend to prosecute children under fourteen for felony murder when the un-
derlying felony is not also a "life felony" in adult court. While section
985.225, unconstitutionally permits a child of any age to be indicted for a
"life felony," and treated like an adult in every way, it is inconsistent with
public policy and legislative intent to include felony murder among the quali-
fying life felonies.65
Lastly, a child's right to due process is violated when a child is sen-
tenced as an adult to life without parole for felony murder where the underly-
ing felony did not contain an element of intentional wrongdoing. Tate was
never shown to have had any intent to harm. Sentencing a twelve-year-old,
whose moral guilt was not established, is at odds with traditional concepts of
ordered liberty: "American criminal law has long considered a defendant's
intention--and therefore his moral guilt--to be critical to the 'degree of [his]
criminal culpability.' ' 66 Tate was entitled to a reversal of his life sentence on
this ground alone.
IV. SO MUCH FOR A CHILD'S RIGHTS TO PRIVACY WHEN THE CHILD IS
TREATED AS AN ADULT
The Florida Constitution expressly provides for a strong right to privacy
not found in the United States Constitution.67 Florida's strong right to pri-
vacy is set forth in Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution. When a
child is charged as an adult and the child is treated "in every aspect" as an
adult, the child's right to privacy is violated. Children, even juvenile offend-
ers, have unique privacy rights and the adult court does not provide for the
64. Older juveniles may be presumed to have capacity to form criminal intent, and there-
fore a felony murder conviction may stand with a mere showing of an intent to commit the
underlying felony.
65. See People v. Cruz, 225 A.D.2d 790 (1996) (holding a fifteen-year-old could not be
held criminally responsible for felony murder when the underlying felony was one for which
there was no adult criminal responsibility and therefore no "felonious intent" to transfer).
66. Emmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 698 (1975)).
67. Winfield v. Dep't. of Bus. Reg., 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
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protection of these rights; however, the juvenile system does. When a child
has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the compelling state interest standard
of review must be met when assessing a claim of governmental intrusion.68
Whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy is determined
by considering all the circumstances, including subjective and objective
manifestations of that expectation and the values society seeks to foster.69
The juvenile code is evidence that society seeks to foster the privacy rights of
children by keeping their school records and court records confidential.7"
Children have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the confidentiality
of their elementary education records. 7' The Legislature has passed laws that
make school records inadmissible in juvenile proceedings prior to a disposi-
tion hearing.712 However, once transferred to adult court, there are no eviden-
tiary rules in place to protect these rights.
Unless and until the Florida Legislature passes laws that protect a
child's right to privacy in adult court, or makes a compelling showing to treat
children as adults in every way, treating our youngest offenders as adults
violates this constitutionally protected right. While older juveniles may not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy because their status as adults is
uncontested, the privacy rights of children under fourteen should be pro-
tected at least until a final judgment is rendered. Treating children as adults
in this respect is unnecessary because keeping the record confidential would
not impair the state's interest in public safety.
V. REVERSAL OF TATE'S CONVICTION AND MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE
BECAUSE OF A FAILURE TO ESTABLISH COMPETENCY
The appellate decision reversing Tate's conviction and sentence was
based upon the trial court's failure to establish that Tate was competent to
proceed to trial as an adult.73 Tate contended on appeal that his conviction
68. Id.
69. Bd. of County Cmm'rs of Palm Beach County v. D.B., 784 So. 2d 585, 588-89 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
70. FLA. STAT. § 228.093(l)(d) (2003).
71. See id. ("[e]very pupil or student shall have a right of privacy with respect to the
education records kept on him or her"); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2000); Owasso Ind.
School Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 428 (2002) ("sensitive information about stu-
dents may not be released without parental consent" and schools that violate this law may lose
federal funding).
72. See FLA. STAT § 228.093(12) (2003); F.A.T. v. State, 690 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (vacating judgment because school attendance records were inadmissible).
73. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). In analyzing the
facts, the appellate court determined that this could not have been accidental. Id. Under-
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and resultant life sentence without parole violated due process because: 1) it
was unfair to apply the felony murder rule to Tate and all children under
fourteen without proving capacity to form criminal intent;74 2) felony murder
should not apply to children under fourteen in adult court when the court
lacks jurisdiction over the predicate felony;75 and 3) even if the felony mur-
der rule applied, the jury failed to find that Tate intended to harm anyone.76
Shortly after Tate's conviction, yet prior to sentencing, appellate counsel
was brought in to "clean up the mess." When undersigned first met with
Tate, it was evident that the child was unable to appropriately assist in his
defense, and was not capable of understanding important principles of law
relevant to the post-trial proceedings. Counsel immediately requested com-
petency evaluations, and questioned Tate's pre-trial decisions based upon his
lack of competency at the time.77 This was done, knowing all along that
should the court find Tate incompetent only for sentencing, re-sentencing
would result in the same sentence-life imprisonment without parole, despite
the fact that Lionel Tate was twelve at the time of the incident. Therefore,
counsel continually argued that Lionel Tate was incompetent post-trial, pre-
trial, and during trial, requiring a re-trial.
First, the court needed to grapple with the question of whether a retroac-
tive competency evaluation was appropriate." The court determined that
because of the vast amount of time which had elapsed, a retroactive compe-
tency hearing would not be beneficial.79 Accordingly, the court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.8°
The question of whether an accused can proceed to trial while a minor
is easily distinguishable from the question of whether anyone is competent to
be tried. Based upon Tate's young age, twelve-years-old at the time of the
offense, his low IQ of 90, his developmental immaturity, his lack of prior
exposure to the criminal justice system, and the overall facts and circum-
signed respectfully points out the fact that all of the facts were not presented to the appellate
tribunal. Based upon the facts presented, the appellate decision is accurate in determining that
the cause of death appears to be intentional rather than accidental. However, based upon
evidence established and ascertained after undersigned counsel was brought in to assist, strong
evidence supports Tate's assertions of innocence based upon a lack of any criminal intent, and
strong evidence, buttressed by expert medical testimony, supports Tate's claims that Tiffany
Eunick's death was accidental.
74. Id. at 53.
75. Id. at 51.
76. Id. at 53.
77. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
78. Id. at 51.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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stances, the appellate tribunal correctly determined that Tate was not proven
to be competent to proceed to trial or to be sentenced.8' Accordingly, the
result in his case was eminently fair.
VI. CHILDREN TRIED As ADULTS: A PRESUMPTION OF
INHERENT INCOMPETENCY
Tate asserted that his State and Federal constitutional rights to due
process of law and his rights to a fair trial were violated by the trial court's
failure to order competency evaluations, to conduct a competency hearing on
its own initiative or at the repeated requests by the defense.8" Tate main-
tained that bona fide evidence of his incompetence entitled him to be evalu-
ated for competency and for the court to conduct a competency hearing prior
to trial and sentencing, because he was facing a mandatory life sentence if
convicted. Tate maintained on appeal that the court's failure to make any
inquiry into his competence deprived him of his right to a fair trial and to due
process of law.83
In light of Lionel Tate's extremely young age and his lack of previous
exposure to the judicial system, competency evaluations were warranted.
Exacerbating the situation was the complexity of the legal proceedings. In
light of the testimony elicited by both parties regarding Tate's developmental
immaturity, and the submission of affidavits from lawyers and a neuropsy-
chologist that Tate lacked the necessary competency to proceed, ample evi-
dence existed to appoint psychologists to evaluate Tate and to require a com-
petency hearing."
A defendant is considered competent to stand trial if he "has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understand-
ing of the proceedings against him."85 The trial court was well aware of the
fact that Tate was only thirteen at the time of the trial, and twelve at the time
of arrest-when crucial defense decisions were made. The Supreme Court
has, in many contexts, commented on the reduced capacities of juveniles,
81. Jd. at 50.
82. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 50.
83. Id. at 46-47; see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Hill v. State, 473 So. 2d
1253, 1257 (Fla. 1985).
84. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 48-49 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Prior to trial, the
court conducted a brief plea colloquy with then thirteen-year-old Tate, which was profoundly
inadequate to determine his competence for a decision of such tremendous consequence, given
his age, immaturity, and nine or ten-year-old mental age. Id. at 50.
85. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
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including their inability "to think in long-range terms" and inability to under-
stand the costs and benefits of certain decisions. s6
The Appellant's age is even more significant when analyzing the com-
plexity of the proceedings against him. The "level of capacity sufficient to
understand simple charges, such as driving without a license, may be grossly
insufficient when a more complicated offense is involved. 87 Here, the of-
fense was among the most serious of chargeable offenses. Nevertheless,
without any court ordered competency evaluations, Tate was asked to make
profound decisions throughout the trial process regarding defense strategy,
make relevant factual disclosures, intelligently analyze plea offers, and con-
sider waiving important State and Federal constitutional rights.
Tate's immaturity and developmental delays were very much at the
heart of the permitted defense at trial.88 Testimony revealed that this particu-
lar child was at an even greater intellectual and emotional disadvantage than
the average thirteen-year-old. His I.Q. was 90 or 91, meaning that seventy-
five percent of children his age scored higher. 89 Further, the doctors opined
Tate had significant mental delays. 90 Even the State forensic psychologists
agreed that Tate was immature, although one state witness did not agree with
the concept of using a mental age.9'
Appellate counsel requested competency evaluations post-trial, prior to
sentencing, both orally and in writing. The evidence presented to the trial
court clearly suggested that a competency evaluation was needed due to
Tate's youth and immaturity.92 The trial court abused its discretion in deny-
ing defense requests for a competency evaluation. 93
Appellate counsel requested a competency evaluation during a hearing
on Defendant's Motion for New Trial, stating that Tate "has no clue what we
86. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825, 834 (1988); see Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (CFC 15-18).
87. Melton et. al., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, (1997). For example, the Appellant maintains that the
felony-murder rule was never intended as a vehicle to prosecute children under fourteen years
of age for first degree murder (CFC 4).
88. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 50. While the defense attempted a "wrestling intoxication de-
fense," because of the trial court's pretrial rulings on state motions in limine, Tate's defense at
trial centered around his lack of knowledge and lack of intent to harm.
89. Id. at 50.
90. Id. at 48.
91. Id. at 49 n.2.
92. Id. at 46-47.
93. See Kelly v. State, 797 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing the
conviction applying abuse of discretion as the proper standard of review in denying request
for competency hearing).
2004]
15
Rosenbaum: Child's Play No Longer: Children Charged and Tried as Adullts in
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LAWREVIEW
are talking about."'94 The judge asked Tate if he understood, and Tate shook
his head "no."95 At that time, the court correctly determined that "at a mini-
mum Tate should be evaluated by mental health experts." 96 The court based
its ruling on Rule 3.210 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, stating:
I'm also convinced that if I denied your hearing at this particular point,
that I would get ordered by the Fourth District Court of Appeals [sic] to
have such a hearing. And I'd rather do that while testimony is fresh,
rather than trying to recall what happened three or four or five or six
months down the road.
97
Minutes later, the judge "changed his mind" and denied Tate's oral mo-
tion for a competency hearing, improperly denying leave for the defense to
file a written motion.9" The judge inappropriately based his decision solely
on Tate's demeanor in court.99 A written motion and affidavits were filed
nonetheless, maintaining that the Defendant was not competent to proceed. 1°°
The trial court denied Tate's written Motion to Determine Competency, in
large part, because it was incomprehensible to the judge that none of the nu-
merous professionals, who had been in contact with Tate, had previously
requested a competency hearing.''
Although the court's frustration that competency was not raised pretrial
or during trial might be justified,0 2 the cited reasons for denial of the motion
are irrelevant.103  Defense counsel's affidavit specifically stated that "he
94. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 47 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 48.
99. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48. Dr. Borg-Cater later testified for the state that she adminis-
tered a twenty minute "competency interview" during her risk assessment evaluation and
believed Tate to be competent. Id. at 47 n.2. The psychologist's testimony was over a defense
objection and an uncontroverted Record that the competency interview was not authorized by
a court order. Id. The defense maintained any competency evaluation was not permissible
under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and violated the Specialty Guidelines for
Forensic Psychology. Id. Even state forensic expert Dr. Brannon admitted that with children
you must "go deeper" to test their insights to see if they really understand. Id.
100. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
101. Id. at 48.
102. ld. at 49. Tate's trial counsel did not question Tate's competency and learned during
discovery that one of the state's experts, Dr. Bourg-Carter claimed to have had the verbal
consent of Tate, his mother, and a defense expert to perform a competency evaluation Id. at
49 n.2.
103. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1965); (stating failure
of defense to raise competency, mental alertness displayed during "colloquies" with judge and
demeanor at trial cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on competency).
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[Tate] is unable to communicate with me... and he did not and still does not
possess an ability to appreciate the gravity of the charges ... " Neuropsy-
chologist Dr. Mittenberg's affidavit stated: "Tate has not been able to follow
along with the legal proceedings I have been involved with."' °5 In addition,
the court's order ("R 764") did not apply the proper standard for determining
the motions: "the proper inquiry is whether the defendant may be incompe-
tent, not whether he is incompetent."' 0 6 Therefore, the trial court not only
failed to initiate a competency hearing under Pate and Hill, it abused its dis-
cretion by denying oral and written motions to determine Tate's compe-
tency.
07
The written motion requested, inter alia, appointment of experts and a
hearing to determine whether Tate was competent to reject the plea offer, and
whether he had the ability to appreciate the range and nature of the possible
penalties that could be imposed. 0 8 This motion was denied as untimely, and
the court refused to consider the merits of the motion.'0 9 The trial court erred
because a competency hearing is required at any material stage of a criminal
proceeding or "when necessary for a just resolution of the issues being con-
sidered.""0 Further, Tate's motion served as yet another reminder to the
court of its obligation pursuant to Pate and Rules 3.210 and 3.211 of the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure to determine Tate's competence when
reasonable grounds exist to believe an accused may be incompetent.'
Despite the well-founded professional doubts concerning Tate's compe-
tency, the judge denied all defense requests for Tate to be evaluated by ap-
propriate mental health practitioners." 2 The court refused to conduct a hear-
ing, which would have allowed the balancing of factors, an evaluation of the
situation, and for the court to make a competency determination based upon
the opinions of experts. The court stated that the Defendant's demeanor and
disinterest did not mean that he did not understand the proceedings." 3 More
104. Defense Counsel's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Determine Competency, Tate v.
State, 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 4D01-1306).
105. Dr. Mittenberg's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Determine Competency, Tate
(No. 4D01-1306).
106. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see Tingle v. State,
536 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla. 1988).
107. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
108. Id. at51;seeFLA. R.CRM. P. 3.211.
109. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
110. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Ill. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47, n.2.
112. ld. at 48.
113. Id. at 50.
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importantly, the judge relied heavily upon the fact that incompetency was
never previously raised by the defense or forensic psychologists.' 14
The facts focused on by the trial judge are irrelevant." 5 As in Pate,
there is no justification for ignoring the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Mit-
tenberg regarding the defendant's reduced mental functioning and his opin-
ion that a competency hearing was necessary." 6 There was no reason not to
give some weight to the sworn affidavits of experienced counsel and a neu-
ropsychologist who each opined that Tate "did not and still does not possess
an ability to appreciate the gravity of the charges" and the possible penal-
ties. 17
In Hill v. State,"8 applying the United States Supreme Court prece-
dents," 9 the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the state's contention that
"there was no evidence before the court that was sufficient to raise a bona
fide doubt as to Hill's competency to stand trial.' 20 Indeed, the situation at
bar is easily distinguishable from those where competency evaluations were
authorized by the court and conducted by appropriate professionals, or where
a full competency hearing was conducted.'
Further, Tate's trial counsel, an officer of the court, offered to directly
reveal to the judge Tate's comments that led him to believe that Tate was not
competent. 22 However, the court refused to receive the information. 23
Without question, reasonable grounds existed to believe that Tate was not
mentally competent to proceed, and that he required an evaluation, constitut-
ing reversible error. 124 The foregoing established a bona fide doubt as to
Tate's competency, and no logical reason supports the trial court's failure to
order evaluations or to initiate a competency hearing. The trial court's fail-
ure to order a competency hearing violated Tate's State and Federal constitu-
114. Id. at 48.
115. Pate, 383 U.S. at 384-85.
116. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 385 (1965) (stating appropriate demeanor at trial cannot be relied upon to dis-
pense with a hearing on competency).
117. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 46-47, 48.
118. 473 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1985),
119. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate, 383 U.S. at 375; Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956).
120. Hill, 473 So. 2d at 1259.
121. See e.g. Mora v. State, 814 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2002).
122. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
123. Id.
124. See Johnson v. State, 756 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Finkelstein v.
State, 574 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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tional rights to due process of law and right to a fair trial, requiring reversal
of the conviction and a remand for a new trial. '25
In a courageous ruling, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed
Tate's conviction and sentence imposed for first degree murder as an adult,
and remanding the cause for re-trial following a determination of compe-
tency. 1
26
When judges, prosecutors, victims' families, and juvenile justice or-
ganizations throughout the world vocally pronounce the inequity of Florida's
juvenile transfer statutes, the way we treat our kids must be addressed and
the laws changed.
Presently, two bills are pending before the Florida Senate addressing
sentencing of juveniles. Each Bill is sponsored by Democratic Florida Sena-
tors. Senator Walter "Skip" Campbell has introduced Senate Bill 1346 ("SB
1346"), which limits the age at which a minor convicted of an offense pun-
ishable by death or life imprisonment may be sentenced as an adult. 127 SB
1346 would amend sections 985.226 and 985.227 of the Florida Statutes and
revise the requirements of the State Attorney with respect to prosecuting a
minor as an adult for violent felonies and for offenses punishable by death or
life imprisonment.2 8 SB 1346 would require that the courts commit a child
seventeen or younger at the time of the offense to the Department of Juvenile
or to a maximum-risk facility following the child's conviction of an offense
that, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by death or life impris-
onment. The court would be required to conduct a hearing after the child
reaches the age of twenty-one to determine whether the child was rehabili-
tated. If so, the child would be placed on conditional release, if not, the child
would be moved to adult prison with the eligibility for parole as an adult
offender.
125. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
126. Id. at 54. Tate, the State of Florida, and the decedent's family all agreed that a nego-
tiated plea was in everyone's best interest. A guilty-best interest plea was negotiated wherein
Tate entered a guilty-best interest plea to the reduced charged of murder in the second degree,
as an adult, and as a result thereof was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to three (3) years
Department of Juvenile Justice, followed by one (1) year of community control, followed by
ten (10) years probation, with special conditions that he perform 1000 hours of community
service and receive psychological counseling and follow-up treatment if deemed necessary.
Susan Candiotti, Teen's mom agrees to deal for son: Plea bargain would reduce Lionel
Tate's sentence to three years, CNN.com, Dec. 31, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW
/12/3 l/wrestling.death/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
127. S. 1346, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/
index.cfm?B IMode=ViewBillInfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu= 1 &Year=2004&bilinum= 1346.
128. Id.
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The most "kid friendly" Bill pending is Senate Bill 2104 ("SB 2104"),
lodged by Senator Frederica Wilson, Democrat from Miami. 29  SB 2104
would enable kids to receive scrutiny and potential early release when the
child reaches "the ripe old age" of twenty-one. 3 All offenders under the age
of eighteen would be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice rather
than be warehoused in the Florida State Prison system.'3' SB 2104 calls for
"blended" or "mixed" sentencing, wherein the court has discretion to impose
juvenile sanctions, or a combination of juvenile and adult sanctions.132
Finally, Senator Steve Geller recently proposed Senate Bill 530 ("SB
530"), which was not passed.'3 3 In essence, SB 530 would have provided
that a child fifteen or younger, who was found to have committed an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment, would have been eligible for pa-
role if he or she had not previously been adjudicated for certain offenses.'34
SB 530 would have required that the child be incarcerated in a youthful of-
fender facility for a minimum period.'35 Lastly, SB 530 would have required
the Parole Commission to consult with the child to consider release under
section 947.16, by interviewing the child within eight months after confine-
ment. 36 Thereafter, the child's case would have been eligible for review
every two years to consider possible release. If the child was not granted
parole by the time the child reached twenty-five years of age, the child would
then be transferred from a youthful offender facility to an adult state prison.
VII. CONCLUSION
The best changes in the law should encompass all three aforementioned
Bills; kids should not be tried as adults until they are older and more mature;
prosecutors should not enjoy such broad discretion in prosecuting minors;
129. S. 2104, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004), http://www.flsenate.gov/cgibin/view_page.pl?
Tab=session&Submenu=1 &FT=D&File=sb214.html&Directory=session/2004/Senate/bills/
billtext/html/.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Beth Reinhard, Parole denied for kids who get life, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 1, 2004,
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiheraid/news/state/8326125.htm%20on 2OApril / %201
2004 (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
134. S. 530, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004), http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?BI-
Mode=ViewBilllnfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu-1l&Year=2004&billnum=530; see Associated
Press, Bill would give youthful killers chance at parole, ST. PETERSBURG TiMES, JAN. 8, 2004,
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/01/08/State/Billwould-give
youth.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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and if children under eighteen years of age are convicted they should be sent
to the Department of Juvenile Justice to be rehabilitated. As a society, we
must not lock children up and throw away the key. Every child is redeem-
able.
21
Rosenbaum: Child's Play No Longer: Children Charged and Tried as Adullts in
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
